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 Contingency theory, with regard to risk of homeland security incidents and 
homeland security preparedness, has received considerable empirical support.  In past 
research, risk has been measured subjectively as agency executives’ perceived risk of 
specific homeland security incidents occurring within their jurisdictions.  This study 
examines actual risk, using the objective risk factors of experience with past natural 
hazards, social vulnerability, and urbanization.  These risk factors, used in combination, 
have been significantly associated with terrorism-related homeland security incidents in 
the United States, and are used in risk assessment models of natural hazards.  
Contrary to expectations, the results of this study indicate that objective risk factors 
were not associated with either perceived risk or preparedness.  Policy implications and 
directions for future research are discussed. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
After the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, the paradigm of policing 
expanded to include a homeland security function.  Police departments are now 
expected to take an unprecedented role as the first line of defense for prevention, as 
first responders in the case of incidents, and as a main component of recovery 
operations (Homeland Security Council, 2007; Newman & Clarke, 2008; Oliver, 2006).  
Research has demonstrated that police agencies have taken a variety of steps to 
prepare for homeland security incidents, including updating mutual aid agreements, 
creating special units, and participating in homeland security training.  One of the best 
theories to explain homeland security innovation is contingency theory, which posits that 
organizations respond rationally to contingencies in their external environment and 
innovate to meet their goals.  Applied to homeland security preparedness, police 
agencies with higher levels of risk, a key contingency, are more likely to take steps to 
enhance their preparedness.   
Perceived risk and its impact on behavior is one of the hallmarks of the American 
criminal justice system, but it is typically applied at the individual level.  For example, as 
targeted police patrols or hot spots policing strategies are implemented, offenders are 
less likely to commit crimes because they perceive a higher risk of getting caught.  
When people are in high-risk situations (e.g., walking alone at night), they are more 
likely to take protective measures because they view their risk of victimization to be 
elevated.  Some studies have applied this logic to organizational-level behavior.  As 
criminal justice agency heads perceive an elevated risk of a homeland security incident, 
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they are more likely to take steps to enhance their preparedness.  The difference 
between the organizational and individual-level studies is the relationship between 
perceived risk and behavior.  At the organizational level, perceived risk has only been 
included as a direct predictor of preparedness, while at the individual level, objective 
risk factors indirectly affect behavior through perceived risk.   
To date, studies examining organizational-level behavior have not considered 
that the effects of external contingencies on preparedness may be indirect through 
perceptions of risk.  When testing contingency theory, either explicitly or implicitly, past 
studies have either combined perceived risk and objective risk factors into a single 
variable (Davis et al, 2004), or only examined perceived risk and not considered 
objective risk factors (Burruss, Giblin, & Schafer, 2010) (see Figure 1).  These tactics 
may obscure the intricacies of the associations between objective risk factors, perceived 
risk, and preparedness, as the relationships may be more complex and multifaceted. 
The present study introduces a model of preparedness where objective risk 
factors indirectly affect preparedness through risk perceptions (see Figure 2).  The 
objective risk factors in this study come from a variety of sources guided by different 
lines of research.  Psychological literature indicates that experience with past hazards 
increases the perceived risk of, or rated probability of, future hazard events (Greening, 
Dollinger, & Pitz, 1996).  Along the same lines, people who are more socially vulnerable 
perceive higher victimization risk than those who are less socially vulnerable (Reisig, 
Pratt, & Holtfreter, 2009). Additionally, in determining actual risk, researchers and 
government organizations use measures of physical vulnerability, or properties of the 
built environment that make the area more susceptible to harm (Department of  
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Homeland Security, 2009; Ezell, Bennett, von Winterfeldt, Sokolowski, & Collins, 2010).  
Objective risk factors include measures of past hazards, social vulnerability, and 
urbanization.  Respondents from departments located in areas with higher incidence, 
prevalence, and magnitude of past natural hazards are expected to rate the probability 
of non-terrorism related homeland security incidents as higher when compared to those 
with less experience with past hazards.  Additionally, departments located in counties 
that are more socially vulnerable and more urban should perceive higher risk of 
homeland security incidents.  
Police chiefs or agency heads of small municipal police departments across the 
United States were surveyed and asked questions about their perceived risk of specific 
terrorism-related and non-terrorism related homeland security incidents occurring within 
the next five years in their jurisdictions.  The survey also asked questions about their 
levels of preparedness for homeland security incidents.  Data from past natural 
disasters from the last ten years is utilized, as well as a social vulnerability index and a 
rural to urban continuum code indicating the level of urbanization.  The relationships 
between objective risk factors, perceived risk, and agency preparedness are explored.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Several studies have analyzed the role of police in homeland security efforts.  
Results show that police chiefs feel homeland security is the primary mission of the 
institution of policing (Stewart & Morris, 2009), and have taken a number of steps to 
prepare for homeland security incidents.  Departments have written emergency 
response plans and trained personnel for homeland security response (Burruss et al., 
2010; Pelfrey, 2007), and have created divisions or units to handle homeland security 
threats or incidents (DeLone, 2007; Grillo, 2011).  In addition, local police departments 
are increasingly relying on state police agencies for training and specialized services 
related to homeland security (The Council of State Governments & Eastern Kentucky 
University, 2006).  These past studies, by examining the steps law enforcement 
agencies have taken to prepare for or prevent homeland security events, demonstrate 
that homeland security policing tactics are practiced by departments across the nation.  
They also revealed that not all departments are equally prepared, and some 
researchers have tried to understand what affects levels of preparedness by applying 
contingency theory.   
Contingency Theory 
Linking the idea that risk influences behavior to organizations, contingency theory 
maintains that organizations are dynamic, and rationally adapt to contingencies to 
achieve “fit” with their environment.  By fitting an organization to contingencies, they 
attain effectiveness (Donaldson, 2001).  Donaldson’s (2001) structural adaptation to 
regain fit (SARFIT) model proposes that when organizations shift out of fit with their 
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environment, they change their structure to regain fit.  This has been applied to law 
enforcement organizations; the structures and activities of an agency are influenced by 
contingencies in the external environment (Burruss et al., 2010; Maguire, 2003).  In this 
case, contingencies would be the objective risk of a homeland security incident.  In 
policing, it would follow that police departments have rationally responded to an 
increased risk of homeland security incidents by taking steps to enhance their homeland 
security preparedness. 
While contingency theory did not receive much empirical support when applied to 
community policing innovations (Zhao, Ren, & Lovrich, 2010) or the creation of gang 
units (Katz, Maguire, & Roncek, 2002), it has received considerable support in 
explaining homeland security preparedness (Burruss et al., 2010; Davis et al., 2004; 
Davis, Mariano, Pace, Cotton, & Steinberg, 2006; Gerber, Cohen, Cannon, Patterson, & 
Stewart, 2005; Schafer, Burruss, & Giblin, 2009).  These past studies have 
operationalized risk and preparedness slightly differently, but there are many 
similarities.  While some did not explicitly use contingency theory in framing the 
relationship, perceived risk has been a significant predictor of homeland security 
preparedness. 
RAND conducted three national waves of a survey on the state of terrorism 
preparedness among local law enforcement agencies in the U.S. (Davis et al., 2004; 
Davis et al., 2006).  Focusing on the second wave, as this measured variables of 
interest to the present study, the researchers dichotomized overall risk into two 
components – perceived risk and physical vulnerability.  Perceived risk was measured 
as the perceived likelihood of a terrorist event occurring within their jurisdiction in the 
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next five years.  The levels of risk reported by metropolitan agencies were no different 
than the perceived risk reported by non-metropolitan agencies.  Census region was a 
significant variable; Southern and Western agencies perceived lower risk than the 
Northeastern and Midwestern agencies, which perceived risk as higher.  Additionally, 
law enforcement agencies with less than 30 officers rated their perceived risk levels as 
significantly lower than those agencies with more officers.   
In the same study, physical vulnerability was measured by quantifying the 
number of different types of structures that were considered potential targets within the 
jurisdiction.  This group of survey questions asked whether there were particular types 
of facilities in the respondent’s jurisdiction (e.g. nuclear power plants, agricultural 
facilities, water treatment plants, airports, etc.).  This was summed for a scale of 0- 7 of 
different types of facilities.  Based on responses to the perceived risk and vulnerability 
questions, the departments were classified as high, medium, or low-risk.  The 
researchers determined that higher overall risk was associated with higher levels of 
preparedness.  Interestingly, vulnerability was the driving factor of overall risk, not 
perceived risk (Davis et al., 2004).  RAND did a third wave of this survey, but did not 
include vulnerability measures.  However, researchers found that law enforcement 
agency respondents who perceived the risk of a terrorist attack to be higher had 
participated in more preparedness activities, and perceived the level of adequacy of 
training to be higher (Davis et al., 2006).  
Gerber and colleagues (2005) conducted a survey of municipal government 
officials, primarily first responders (police, fire, or emergency services department 
heads), and examined homeland security preparedness.  Preparedness was measured 
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using two variables – perceived preparedness and preparedness commitment.  
Perceived preparedness was measured by asking the officials to rate their ability to 
respond to a terrorist attack, and preparedness commitment was measured by asking 
officials to rate their cities’ overall commitment to homeland security preparedness.  
While perceived preparedness and preparedness commitment were subjective 
measures, the researchers also assessed two objective aspects of preparedness.  This 
was measured by whether the department had created mutual aid agreements 
specifically related to homeland security, and had tested homeland security emergency 
response plans (Gerber et al., 2005).  Perceived risk was positively and significantly 
associated with perceived preparedness and preparedness commitment.  Additionally, 
large city respondents were more likely to report higher perceptions of preparedness, 
preparedness commitment, and preparedness activities.  However, perceived risk was 
not associated with preparedness activities.  This could indicate a direct effect of large 
cities on preparedness activities, or this could be due to the study only measuring two 
types of preparedness activities (Gerber et al., 2005). 
Examining homeland security practices in small agencies across Illinois, Schafer 
and colleagues (2009) measured perceived risk as the rated likelihood of a specific 
terrorism-related homeland security incident occurring within the jurisdiction within the 
next five years.  Burruss and colleagues (2010) used the same measure when studying 
agencies of all sizes across Illinois.  In both these studies, preparedness was the sum of 
dichotomous measures of several specified measures to enhance their homeland 
security preparedness since the September 11th attacks (Schafer et al., 2009; Burruss 
et al., 2010).  The results from both studies indicated that an increase in perceived risk 
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was positively and significantly associated with preparedness.  Agency size was also an 
important predictor of preparedness, and the authors ascertained that because larger 
agencies are typically found in more urban/metropolitan areas, they may have more 
vulnerability than smaller, more rural agencies, in addition to more intergovernmental 
complexity, cooperation, and networks (Burruss et al., 2010).  While agencies located in 
metropolitan areas reported significantly lower risk, there was a direct positive 
relationship between metropolitan agencies and preparedness (Schafer et al., 2009).  
By examining vulnerability as a separate objective risk measure, this may help explain 
the relationship between size and preparedness. 
What all of these studies show is that perceived risk is positively associated with 
preparedness activities.  All of these studies support contingency theory in that 
perceived risk (the contingency) is positively associated with preparedness activities 
(organizational behavior).  However, contingency theory has only been examined using 
perceived risk as a proxy measure of actual risk.  These two measures of risk, 
subjective perception and objective reality, are discrete.  While perceived risk is 
important, objective risk factors may indirectly affect preparedness through their effect 
on perceived risk.   
Objective Risk 
Calculating objective risk for terrorism-related homeland security incidents 
involves the use of the threat vulnerability consequences (TVC) model.  This is the 
product of threat (the probability of an attack), vulnerability (if it occurs, the probability of 
the attack’s success), and consequences (if the attack occurs, the losses that would be 
incurred through fatalities, injuries, and economic losses) (Ezell et al., 2007).  In this 
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model, threat is the most difficult to calculate; it takes into account the goals, motives, 
and capabilities of terrorists, as well as factors about possible targets.   As opposed to 
the actual probability of an event, threat is typically reported as relative likelihood in 
comparison to other terrorist events, and is calculated by experts in the intelligence 
community (Ezell et al., 2010).   
There has been criticism in applying this model to threats posed by intelligent 
adversaries – terrorists can adapt to and circumvent protective measures, and use risk 
assessment results to plan attacks.  Additionally, some scholars argue that this model 
only examines individual infrastructure targets but does not consider the 
interconnectedness of systems (e.g., electric power grids) (Brown, & Cox, Jr., 2011).  
Scholars have recommended that multiple models be used, not TVC exclusively, to 
estimate the risk of terrorism attacks (Ezell et al., 2010).  In spite of this criticism, the 
TVC model is used by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to assess the risk of 
homeland security incidents, both terrorism-related and non-terrorism related, on 
infrastructure (Department of Homeland Security, 2009). 
Within the natural hazards literature, objective risk is calculated using both target-
specific and hazard-specific information.  Risk is defined as the combination of the 
probability of a hazard occurring, the intensity or impact of the hazard, and the exposure 
and vulnerability of the targets (Hollenstein, 2005).  The history of hazards in a place is 
a salient factor in calculating the probability of reoccurrence (Hufschmidt, Crozier & 
Glade, 2005).  While the terms may be the same, their meanings differ from the TVC 
model.  In psychological risk perception, vulnerability describes the potential for harm, 
which is equivalent to the consequences variable in the TVC model.  Risk, in the 
12 
 
 
psychological perspective, would be the probability of something occurring, equivalent 
to threat in the TVC model.  
How individuals perceive risk is somewhat different than the analytical risk 
assessments performed by experts.  The perception of risk can be defined as, “the 
judgments people make when they are asked to characterize and evaluate” hazards 
(Slovic, 1987, p. 280).  While risk was once thought to be completely objective, it is now 
accepted that risk is actually a subjective judgment and can be influenced by a wide 
array of factors, including emotional and affective processes (Slovic, 2000).   
A recent article applying this psychometric paradigm to risk perception and 
terrorism assessed the relevant literature (Jenkin, 2006).  This revealed that while there 
are nineteen identified qualitative factors used in the psychometric paradigm, they are 
typically reduced to four factors using factor analysis.  Dread, unknown risk, the number 
of people exposed, and the severity of the consequences are the four factors identified.  
Most often, the dread risk factor is the driving force behind overall perceived risk 
(Jenkin, 2006).  The present study examines the relationship between agency heads’ 
opinions of probabilities of homeland security events occurring within their jurisdiction 
and the objective risk factors of social vulnerability, urbanization, and experience with 
past hazards.  These objective risk factors correspond with a number of the elements of 
the psychometric paradigm identified above. 
Hazards. 
In the risk assessment field, it has been established that an experience with a 
past hazard increases the perceptions of probability of that hazard occurring in the 
future.  This is due to both availability and affect heuristics.  The availability heuristic 
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posits that when people experience an event, it is more easily recalled (available), 
which increases their future risk perception.  The affect heuristic suggests that how 
people feel about an event (positive or negative) will impact their risk perceptions.  
Positive feelings decrease risk perceptions, and negative feelings increase risk 
perceptions.  The affect and availability heuristics are closely related, as remembered 
events are linked with affect (Keller, Siegrist, & Gutscher, 2006).  This is supported in 
the criminal justice literature, as people who have been victims of crime rate their 
perceived risk of future victimizations as higher than those who have not been 
victimized (LaGrange, Ferraro, Supancic, 1992).  Experience with past hazards would 
correspond with both dread and severity of the consequences in the psychometric 
paradigm (Jenkin, 2006). 
Vulnerability. 
Another objective risk factor is vulnerability.  Broadly defined, vulnerability is the, 
“susceptibility to damage or harm” (Eakin & Luers, 2006, p. 366).  While vulnerability is 
a term used in multiple scientific disciplines (e.g., geography, economics, earth 
sciences, engineering, etc.), it typically has two main themes: the environment and the 
people that live there.  It is generally agreed upon that vulnerability is made up of three 
components: exposure, sensitivity, and response (Cutter & Finch, 2008, Hogan & 
Marandola, 2005).  However, vulnerability is conceptualized differently across different 
disciplines.  Depending on the discipline, other components to vulnerability could 
include politics, natural resource use and distribution, ecological resilience, and the 
absence of entitlements (Adger, 2006; Eakin & Luers, 2006).  The vulnerability of 
interest in this project is the vulnerability to hazards, whether natural or manmade.  
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Cutter (2003) describes vulnerability as, “those circumstances that put people and 
places at risk and those conditions that reduce the ability of people and places to 
respond to environmental threats” (p. 6).   
Social vulnerability measures the potential for harm to a population.  While 
quantifying social vulnerability is challenging, researchers at the University of South 
Carolina have created a social vulnerability index (SoVI) (Hazards & Vulnerability 
Research Institute, 2010b).  Based on thirty-two variables and seven components (see 
Table 1), this index provides a value for each county in the United States.  Higher 
values are associated with higher levels of social vulnerability.  The value itself is 
unitless, as it is only for comparison to other counties. 
Myriad variables are included in the index based on empirical studies measuring 
the influence of the variables on social vulnerability.  For example, females have been 
shown to have a harder time recovering from disasters.  This can be due to women 
making less money than their male counterparts, and the typical role of childcare.  The 
very young, very old, and disabled are more vulnerable because they may be unable to 
remove themselves from disasters without assistance.  The burden of childcare or 
elderly care when facilities are impacted increases vulnerability as well.  Ethnicity can 
increase social vulnerability to the extent that cultural and language barriers decrease 
receipt of post-disaster funding.  Socioeconomic variables, such as poverty and 
unemployment, indicate the ability to absorb the consequences of disasters and to 
bounce back (see Cutter, Boruff, & Shirley, 2003 for an extensive description and list of 
sources for each concept). 
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Social vulnerability index components
Component
Increases or 
decreases 
social 
vulnerability Name
Percent 
variance 
explained Variables
Percent female headed households
Percent poverty
Percent Black
Percent civilian unemployment
Percent of housing units with no car
Percent with less than twelfth grade education
Percent of population with a disability
Percent of children living in married couple families
Median house value
Median gross rent
Percent of households earning greater than $200,000 annually
Per capita income
Percent Asian
Percent urban population (county, tract levels only)
Population per square mile (block group level only)
Median age
Percent of households receiving social security
Percent of population under age 5 or over age 65
Percent of population with a disability
Percent urban population (county, tract levels only)
Percent renters
People per unit
Percent Hispanic
Percent of population without health insurance
Percent employment in extractive industries
Percent female participation in labor force
Hospitals per capita (county, tract levels only)
Percent of population under age 5 or over age 65
Percent of population 65 and over living in group quarters
Percent female 
Percent civilian unemployment
Percent mobile homes
6  +
Ethnicity 
(Native 
American)
4.837
Percent Native American
7  +
Service 
Employment
4.432
Percent employment in service industry
Total 69.102
Source: Hazards & Vulnerability Research Institute, 2011a
5  +
Gender, Care 
Dependence
6.282
3  + Age 12.805
4  +
Ethnicity 
(Hispanic)
7.988
2  - Wealth 15.742
Table 1. 
1  +
Race (Black), 
Class (Poverty)
17.025
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While the social vulnerability index in this study is place-based, it is interesting to 
note that past studies have indicated that individuals who were more socially vulnerable 
(measured as socioeconomic and minority status) perceived a higher risk of 
victimization (Reisig, et al., 2009).  This has been supported in other studies as well; 
people who are more socially vulnerable generally report higher risk perceptions than 
those who are less socially vulnerable (Kanan & Pruitt, 2002; LaGrange, Ferraro, 
Supancic, 1992). This is possibly due to the decreased ability of the socially vulnerable 
to recover economically from victimization.  According to Reisig and colleagues (2009), 
“This dimension weighs heavily on the minds of low-income residents and racial/ethnic 
minorities who may be less able to absorb effectively the costs associated with such 
losses” (p. 371).  While the indirect relationship between social vulnerability and 
protective measures has been observed, there may be a direct relationship as well.  
Gender and age, variables included in SoVI, have been shown to have direct effects on 
some protective measures (Ferraro, 1995).  Social vulnerability would correspond with 
both dread and severity of consequences in the psychometric paradigm (Jenkin, 2006). 
While social vulnerability refers to a population, physical vulnerabilities are the 
physical properties of the built environment that make an area more susceptible to 
harm.  In quantifying the vulnerability of the built environment, researchers have 
considered variables assessing residential property, commercial and industrial 
development, lifelines, transportation, infrastructure, and monuments/icons (Borden, 
Schmidtlein, Emrich, Piegorsch, & Cutter, 2007).  Past studies have either created an 
index for only particular, predominately large cities (Borden, et al., 2007; Piegorsch, 
Cutter, & Hardisty, 2007), examined these factors in a case study for one area of 
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interest (Armas, 2008), or asked survey respondents to identify the number of different 
types of specific potentially vulnerable targets in their jurisdiction (Davis et al., 2004).  
Studies of vulnerability to natural hazards (e.g., flooding due to climate change) 
measure exposure as physical vulnerability, or the number of people who could be 
impacted (see Brooks, 2003).   
Arguably, urban areas have higher property density, more complex infrastructure, 
more venues of transportation, and more commercial/industrial development.  Urban 
cities have disproportionately been targets of terrorism due to “their role as nerve-
centres of an international economy that puts them at higher risk” (Savitch & Ardashev, 
2001, p.2517).  Terrorism incidents in urban settings are more frequent, and in turn 
have more fatalities, injuries, and physical damages.  Researchers contend that 
terrorists choose to target urban cities because of their vulnerability (Savitch, & 
Ardashev, 2001).  Additionally, counties with higher populations will have more people 
exposed to potential hazards.  In the psychometric paradigm, the physical vulnerability 
of an area would correspond to the number of people exposed, dread, and severity of 
consequences (Jenkin, 2006).  Therefore, an increase in urbanization should be 
associated with an increase in perceived risk.  
Past criminal justice research has indicated the type of area (rural to urban) has 
an impact on protective measures, but only constrained behavior (not defensive 
behavior) (Ferraro, 1995).  Similar findings have been echoed with regard to law 
enforcement agencies.  In a study examining small municipal agencies across Illinois, 
Schafer and colleagues (2009) determined that rural and urban agencies generally did 
not have significant differences in their perceived risk of several different terrorist 
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attacks, while agencies located in metropolitan areas generally had lower perceived 
risk.  However, agencies in metropolitan and urban areas had taken more steps to 
prepare for a homeland security incident than agencies in rural areas (Schafer et al., 
2009).  Therefore, the relationship between urbanization, perceived risk, and 
preparedness is assessed.  It is expected that urbanization will indirectly affect 
preparedness through its relationship with perceived risk, but it may have a direct effect 
as well.   
Physical vulnerability and social vulnerability have been studied together in past 
research.  Borden and colleagues examined the vulnerability of 132 cities in the United 
States to environmental hazards.  They created indices for socio-economical 
vulnerability, built environment vulnerability, and hazard exposure/experience.  Adding 
all three vulnerability index scores together revealed the vulnerability of the cities in 
relation to one another, and indicated that New Orleans was the most vulnerable city in 
the United States (Borden et al., 2007).  
Piegorsch and colleagues (2007) combined the three indices used by Borden 
and colleagues (2007) (social, built environment, and hazard vulnerability) into one 
place-based vulnerability index for 132 cities in the United States.  Using this 
information, and past data on terrorist incidents in the United States, they determined 
that the place-based vulnerability index was able to significantly predict both whether a 
terrorist incident occurred and whether there were casualties in past terrorist events 
(Piegorsch et al., 2007).  
Within the hazards literature, social and physical vulnerability has also been 
linked to perceived risk.  For example, in a study in Romania, people’s awareness of the 
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degree of vulnerability of the building in which they lived was positively and significantly 
associated with seismic risk perceptions.  Additionally, higher levels of social 
vulnerability were associated with higher levels of risk perception, but due to study 
limitations, they were not able to rule out extraneous factors in the link between social 
vulnerability and risk (Armas, 2008).  
The Effect of Risk Perceptions on Behavior 
At the individual level, studies in criminology have examined the relationship 
between perceptions of risk and behavior.  In a model introduced by Ferraro (1995), 
perceived risk is a predecessor to protective measures.  This model has received 
empirical support (Reisig et al., 2009).  At the organizational level, as previously 
discussed, agency respondents’ perceptions of risk are positively associated with 
department preparedness. 
Most individual-level studies examine the link between past experiences and 
protective behaviors through perceived risk.  That is, the relationship between 
experiences and behavior is indirect.  However, experience with past hazards has been 
found to have a direct effect on protective behaviors, in addition to an indirect effect 
through perceived risk.  In a study examining adoption of household hazard 
adjustments, researchers determined that past experiences with hazards increased 
perceived risk of future hazards, which mitigation adjustments and the purchase of 
insurance.  Overall, the relationship between past hazards and protective behaviors was 
not completely mediated by perceived personal risk of experiencing future hazards, as 
experience with past hazards, independent of risk, affected protective measures (Lindell 
& Hwang, 2008).  Additionally, Ferraro (1995) determined that, independent of 
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perceived risk, past victimization was significantly associated with avoidance behaviors 
(e.g., avoiding unsafe areas), but not defensive behaviors (e.g., keeping a weapon in 
the home).  This illustrates that while objective risk factors affect behavior through 
perceived risk, there is still a direct effect.  
Present Study 
Past research has found support for the effect of homeland security risk 
perceptions on preparedness.  Increased perceived risk of homeland security incidents 
is significantly associated with higher levels of preparedness in several studies (Burruss 
et al., 2010; Davis et al., 2004, 2006; Gerber, 2005; Schafer et al., 2009).  However, this 
past research has failed to consider, or has inadequately considered, objective risk 
factors.  By simply measuring the perceived risk of an incident without considering the 
actual risk factors, or contingencies, present in the environment, this may provide an 
incomplete picture of the relationship.  Individual-level studies have established that risk 
perception is an indirect variable between objective risk factors and protective 
measures, but objective risk factors also directly impact behaviors.  To address the gap 
in the organizational-level literature, I propose that objective risk factors will affect 
homeland security preparedness both indirectly through perceived risk, as well as 
directly (see Figure 2).  By using survey data of small municipal agencies, and 
combining this with several sources of data outside of the traditional realm of criminal 
justice, this study should provide a more thorough understanding of the relationship 
between risk and organizational behavior. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
Sample 
The sample for this project included small municipal law enforcement agencies, 
as they are largely understudied in criminal justice research, but represent a majority of 
police agencies across the United States.  Using the 2004 Census of Law Enforcement 
Agencies, agencies with between one and twenty-five full-time officers were selected, 
and the overall sampling frame included 9,708 police departments.  Because urban 
agencies have been shown to be different than rural agencies even after controlling for 
size (see Schafer et al., 2009), the sampling frame was stratified along the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture’s rural-urban continuum.  This is a classification scheme that 
uses population size, population density, and spatial relationship to other metropolitan 
areas.  There are nine classifications, ranging from metropolitan counties in 
metropolitan areas with a population of one million or more, to completely rural or less 
than 2,500 urban population, and not adjacent to a metropolitan area (Economic 
Research Service, 2010).   
Ninety agencies were randomly selected from each stratification level, for a total 
of 810 agencies.  Three waves of the survey were mailed out, using the agency address 
from the Census of Law Enforcement Agencies.  Surveys were addressed to the head 
of the agency.  This information predominantly came from the National Directory of Law 
Enforcement Administrators (National Public Safety Information Bureau, 2011).  If the 
name of the agency head was not available through this directory, an attempt was made 
to find this information online from agencies’ websites (if available), or various other web 
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sources.  The surveys were sent with a cover letter describing the project, as well as a 
pre-paid pre-addressed envelope for the respondent to use to return the completed 
survey.  Twenty-four surveys were returned as undeliverable with notations from city 
personnel or sheriffs’ office personnel reporting that the sampled agency was no longer 
in existence.  As a result of this, the final sample size was reduced to 786 agencies (see 
Table 2).  After the survey mailings, the response rate was approximately 38 percent. 
An attempt was made to contact each of the non-responding agencies by phone.  
As the chief was usually not available, messages were left either on voicemail, with 
agency personnel, with city personnel, or others, to remind the chief to complete and 
return the survey.  An additional copy of the survey was sent to agencies as requested.  
At the end of data collection, 350 completed surveys had been returned, for an overall 
response rate of 44.5 percent (see Table 2 for descriptive statistics of the sample).  To 
consider non-response bias, agencies, respondents and non-respondents will be 
compared using data from the Census for Law Enforcement Agencies as well as data 
from the objective risk factors.  Data from this survey was merged with data about past 
hazards and the social vulnerability index as described below.  
Endogenous Variables 
In this study, the final outcome variable is preparedness (see Figure 3).  
Preparedness was measured in the law enforcement survey, and agency heads were 
asked to indicate whether they had engaged in thirteen specific activities, including 
mutual aid agreements, training activities, and risk assessments, among others (see 
Table 3).  The preparedness variable was summed to create a scale of 0 to 13 
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.815).  
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Number of 
agencies %
Agency size, 2004
1-5 officers 182 52.0
6-10 officers 89 25.4
11-15 officers 39 11.1
16-20 officers 21 6.0
21-25 officers 19 5.4
Total 350 100.0
Region of country
Northeast 54 15.4
South 114 32.6
Midwest 136 38.9
West 46 13.1
Total 350 100.0
Rural-urban continuum code
1 38 10.9
2 36 10.3
3 51 14.6
4 40 11.4
5 39 11.1
6 38 10.9
7 38 10.9
8 36 10.3
9 34 9.7
Total 350 100.0
Table 2.  
Size and region of the country of responding agencies
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Mean
Standard 
Deviation
Public safety agencies operating in or nearby jurisdiction 
(including responding agency) use a shared radio network that 
achieves interoperability 0.910 0.287
Has in place one or more mutual aid or cooperative agreements 
with other law enforcement organizations that cover homeland 
security issues 0.790 0.408
Has in place systematic procedures ensuring that homeland 
security advisories/emergency notifications are distributed to 
appropriate personnel 0.633 0.483
Has a written directive or protocol for contacting the proper 
authorities in the event of a homeland security incident or threat 
within jurisdiction 0.592 0.492
Part of a regional interagency task force or working group that 
functions, in part, to address issues of prevention, preparedness, 
response, and/or recovery related to homeland security 0.516 0.500
Has a written response plan outlining preparedness, response, 
and/or recovery issues in the event of a homeland security-
related incident 0.487 0.501
Has in place one or more mutual aid or cooperative agreements 
with non-law enforcement agencies such as transit services, 
public works, or other governmental agencies that cover 
homeland security issues 0.458 0.499
Members of agency trained in homeland security procedures in 
past 12 months 0.437 0.497
Members of agency participated in homeland security-focused 
field training or table top exercises in past 12 months 0.373 0.484
Completed an inventory of threats or hazards in jurisdiction in 
past 12 months 0.329 0.471
Conducted a risk assessment to identify high-risk or high-value 
targets or assets within jurisdiction in past 12 months 0.321 0.4672.0%
Disseminated information to members of the community in an 
attempt to increase citizen preparedness in past 12 months 0.262 0.441
Has individual(s) or special unit specifically assigned to address 
the homeland security function 0.239 0.427
2n=343
Table 3.  
Percent of agencies taking steps or activities  to enhance homeland security prevention, 
preparedness, response, and recovery 1
Type of Step or Activity for Enhancement of Homeland Security2
1Each question asked whether or not agencies engaged in these steps or activities.  Higher 
mean scores indicate higher engagement in steps or activities. 
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Perceived risk of terrorism-related and non-terrorism related homeland security 
incidents are also endogenous variables.  In the law enforcement survey, homeland 
security was defined broadly using an all-hazards approach, and included efforts to 
protect against, prepare for, respond to, and recover from threats or hazards posed not 
only by terrorism but also major disasters/emergencies and catastrophic events that 
involve significant casualties and/or substantial destruction of property (e.g., severe 
weather, chemical spills, large explosions).  This definition was given directly before the 
perceived risk questions.  Agencies were asked to rate the likelihood, on a scale of 0 
(not at all likely) to 10 (very likely), of specific events occurring within their jurisdiction in 
the next five years (see Table 4).  Perceived risk is measured as a latent construct, and 
an assessment of the measurement model is presented in the analysis section. 
Mean 
scores
Standard 
Deviation
Terrorism-related incident2
Cyber-terrorism 2.76 2.52
Conventional explosive 2.71 2.35
Chemical 2.42 2.42
Biological 1.95 2.03
Terrorism incident involving military weapons 1.85 2.06
Radiological 1.71 2.03
Non-terrorism related incident3
Severe weather, earthquake, or wildfire 6.46 2.60
Chemical spill or radiological leak 3.98 2.90
Medical pandemic 3.51 2.30
Explosion involving mass casualties 3.11 2.47
Structural failure involving mass casualties 2.59 2.32
2n=344
3n=348
Table 4.  
Perceived likelihood of homeland security incidents occurring within the next five years (mean 
scores) 1
Type of Incident
1Each incident was ranked on a scale from 0 (not at all likely) to 10 (very likely).  Higher scores 
reflect a greater perceived likelihood of each incident type occurring.   
26 
 
 
Exogenous Variables 
Past hazards. 
The exogenous variables in this study are the objective risk factors.  These 
include past hazards, urbanization, and social vulnerability.  Utilizing information from 
the Spatial Hazard Events and Losses Database for the United State (SHELDUS), past 
hazards were measured using three latent constructs represented by six indicators (a 
description of the measurement model is presented in the analysis section)..  This 
dataset was compiled by the Hazards and Vulnerability Research Institute at the 
University of South Carolina, and provides county-level data that details information 
from eighteen different types of natural hazards.1.  For this dataset, these eighteen 
types of natural hazards are included if they caused any injury or loss, monetary or 
human.   
Data from SHELDUS were derived primarily from the monthly Storm Data 
publications from the National Climatic Data Center.  Additional data sources include 
the National Geophysical Data Center, the National Hurricane Center, the Global 
Volcanism Program, and the United States Fire Administration, among others. This 
analysis includes all events that occurred during the ten year period between 2001 and 
2010.  The SHELDUS data provides the beginning and end dates of the hazard, the 
type of hazard, the location (county and state), the number of injuries, and the number 
of fatalities, as well as monetary amounts of property damage and crop damage both in 
dollars adjusted and unadjusted to inflation (Hazards & Vulnerability Research Institute, 
                                            
1 Types of hazards include avalanche, coastal, drought, earthquake, flooding, fog, hail, 
heat, hurricane/tropical storm, landslide, lightning, severe storm/thunder storm, tornado, 
tsunami/seiche, volcano, wildfire, wind, winter weather. 
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2011b).  The first indicator will be the diversity of incidents, measured as how many 
different types of the 18 natural hazards occurred from 2001 to 2010.  The second 
indicator is the total number of natural hazards in each county per year.  Following 
Borden and colleagues’ (2009) use of this dataset, the magnitude of past hazards were 
calculated.  The magnitude of damage is measured as the total dollar amount of crop 
damage divided by the county’s calculated domestic product, and the total dollar 
amount of property damage divided by the county’s calculated domestic product2.  As 
the final two indicators, the magnitude of injuries and fatalities will be measured as the 
calculated rate per 10,000 in the population3.  To address problems with skewness and 
kurtosis with the hazards variables, the logs of these variables were used (excluding the 
diversity of incidents, which did not have these problems) (see Table 5).   
Vulnerability. 
The Hazards and Vulnerability Research Institute at South Carolina has 
developed a Social Vulnerability Index (SoVI) that combines thirty-one factors indicating 
the level of social vulnerability of all counties across the United States (see Table 1 for a 
full list of variables).  The primary source of data for the SoVI is the United States 
                                            
2Property damage and crop damage, in dollars, were first standardized to 2011 dollars.  
To determine the magnitude of the loss specific to each county, the state’s gross 
domestic product from 2006 was multiplied by the county’s employment as a proportion 
of the state employment from 2006.  The resulting dollar amount is estimated as the 
county’s domestic product of 2006.  The total property damage and total crop damage 
for each county was divided by its’ domestic product to determine the magnitude of the 
damage as a percent of its’ domestic product (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2011).    
3 To determine the magnitude of the injuries and fatalities, the total injuries and fatalities 
in the time period were divided by the population of the county and multiplied by 10,000 
to give the injuries and fatalities per 10,000 people in the population (United States 
Census Bureau, 2007). 
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Census Bureau, and is based on the years 2005 to 2009.  Other data sources include 
the American Community Survey, the Geographic Names and Information System, and 
the Small Area Health Insurance Estimates (Hazards & Vulnerability Research Institute, 
2011a).  Each of the seven components are added together (not weighted) to come up 
with the final SoVI value. This is a unitless, comparative scale, so the particular 
numbers have no true value.  Higher scores indicate higher levels of social vulnerability. 
Lacking an appropriate measurement for physical vulnerability, the rural to urban 
continuum code was used.    
Table 5.
Descriptive statistics for hazards variables and normality issues addressed by log transformation
Mean
Standard 
deviation Skewness Kurtosis Skewness Kurtosis
Injury rate1 1.689 4.871 7.631 76.750 1.879 4.005
Fatality rate1 0.298 0.695 4.584 25.895 2.667 7.987
Incidents per year2 5.827 5.369 5.369 7.918 0.228 2.950
Diversity of incidents3 6.648 1.659 1.659 0.142
Property damage4 2.928 12.531 12.531 92.514 2.510 7.505
Crop damage4 0.773 3.424 3.424 119.093 3.206 11.039
Logged variable
3On a scale of 0-18, how many different types out of hazards occurred from 
2001-2010
4As a percent of 2006 county domestic product
Original variable
1Per 10,000 people
2Total number of incidents divided by 10 years
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Control Variable 
Past studies have found that agency size has a significant impact on 
preparedness activities (see Burruss et al., 2010).  Therefore, agency size will be used 
as a control variable  
Data Analysis 
Structural equation modeling (SEM) is a category of statistical techniques that 
uses a variance-covariance matrix to compare the research model to the data (Gau, 
2010).  SEM is ideal for the present study, because it allows the use of latent (or 
unmeasured) variables in the examination of both direct and indirect effects of the 
independent variables.  With regression, only the direct relationships can be uncovered.  
However, past research has indicated that perceived risk mediates the relationship 
between the objective risk factors and preparedness, suggesting that these are indirect 
relationships.  Additionally, SEM produces fit indices that allow for the comparison and 
evaluation of models.  SEM also takes into account measurement error (Bryne, 2012; 
Gau, 2010).  Therefore, SEM is an appropriate analysis plan. 
The first step was to use confirmatory factor analysis to demonstrate the validity 
for the hypothesized latent variables (risk and hazards).  Once this is established, both 
models’ (direct and indirect) fit indices are compared.  The fit statistics that are most 
useful for determining the goodness-of fit of the model to the data are the comparative 
fit index (CFI), the Tucker-Lewis index (TLI), and the root mean square error of 
approximation (RMSEA).  Both the CFI and the TLI indicate the model fit improvement 
by comparing the hypothesized model to the nested baseline model.  CFI values range 
from 0 to 1.00, and values above 0.90 or 0.95 are indicative of a good fit.  TLI values 
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can exceed 1.00, and values close to 1.00 indicate a good fit (Byrne, 2012). The 
RMSEA is an absolute fit index which takes into account the complexity of the model, 
and lower values represent an increase in goodness of fit.  Values less than 0.05 
indicate a good fit, values between 0.08 and 0.10 indicate mediocre fit, and values 
greater than 0.10 indicate poor fit (Bryne, 2012).  An additional fit statistic is the chi-
square statistic (Χ2).  If this value is significant, this may indicate a poor fit.  However, 
this statistic is sensitive to sample size, and since the sample size used here is 350, the 
other indices will be used to judge the fit of the model.  Finally, to compare two models 
to one another, these fit statistics, in addition to the Akaike information criterion (AIC), 
are used.  This also takes into account the complexity of the model, but the value of the 
AIC itself is used for comparison only.  The model with a lower AIC value fits the data 
better than a model with a higher AIC value (Bryne, 2012).  
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CHAPTER 4 
FINDINGS 
Past research indicates that terrorism risk and non-terrorism risk are discrete 
constructs (Giblin, Burruss, & Schafer, in press).  The fit statistics for risk as a single 
latent factor indicated that this was not a good fit to the data (see Figure 3).  In contrast, 
when risk of homeland security incidents was broken down to terrorism-related risk 
(chemical, biological, radiological, conventional explosive, cyber-terrorism, military 
weapons) and non-terrorism related risk (structural failure, severe weather, explosion, 
chemical spill/radiological leak, medical pandemic); the model fit the data better (see 
Figure 4).  In this two-factor model, the fit statistics indicated a good overall fit.  The risk 
of both terrorism-related and non-terrorism related chemical incidents were correlated 
because it is likely that these two types of incidents, whether intentional or otherwise, 
are most likely driven by chemicals facilities in the area (Giblin et al., in press).   
The hazards model used by Borden and colleagues (2007) and Piegorsch and 
colleagues (2007) included two latent factors (injury, death and property losses; number 
and diversity of incidents), and one directly observed variables (crop damage).  
However, this produced poor model fit statistics (see Figure 5).  This could be sample-
specific, as both previous studies used large cities only, while the sample used in this 
study includes both rural and urban counties.
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Using exploratory factor analysis with Varimax rotation, the six variables 
measuring hazards loaded onto three factors: monetary losses (property and crop 
damage in dollars), human casualties (rate of injuries or deaths), and number and 
diversity of incidents.  The models did not fit the data when one and two factors were 
used, but with three factors, the fit statistics indicated that this model approaches a 
good fit.  The factor measuring the number and diversity of incidents is correlated with 
both human casualties and monetary damage, because those areas with more incidents 
35 
 
 
and types of incidents will most likely have greater damage. The factor loading scores 
and fit statistics are presented in Figure 6. 
 
To test the hypothesized model, the structural model was entered into Mplus with 
the indirect paths identified.  The curved dotted lines represent correlations.  Based on 
the modification indices in Mplus, as well as past research (Burruss et al., 2010; Giblin 
et al., in press), terrorism and non-terrorism related risk were correlated.  Additionally, 
the social vulnerability index was correlated with human casualties, as more socially 
vulnerable areas have higher potential for harm to people.  The SoVI was also 
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correlated with urbanization, because several of the variables that comprise the index 
would be more likely in an urban area.  The fit statistics indicated the model approached 
a good fit; however, no objective risk factor was significantly associated with perceived 
risk or preparedness (see Figure 7).  Perceived risk of a terrorism-related homeland 
security incident was the only variable significantly associated with preparedness, and 
none of the indirect models identified were significant (see Table 6).4 
The R2 for this model indicates that only 0.7 percent of the variation in terrorism-
related risk and 1.9 percent of the variation in non-terrorism risk are explained.  In other 
words, over 98 percent of the variation in perceived risk is explained by factors not 
included in this model.  The model explains 13.7 percent of the variation in homeland 
security preparedness.  
  
                                            
4 A model with only direct paths to preparedness was also tested.  The results were not 
significantly different from the model with both direct and indirect paths.  The only 
significant predictors of preparedness were terrorism-related risk and agency size. 
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Table 6.
Results of a structural model predicting preparedness, including both direct and indirect paths
Terrorism-
related risk
Non-terrorism 
related risk Preparedness
β β β
Direct effects
Hazards
Monetary losses -0.027 -0.075
Human casualities 0.063 0.121
Number and diversity of events 0.076 -0.0750.013
Social vulnerability 0.013 -0.055 -0.069
Urbanization -0.059 0.076 0.045
Agency size 0.053 0.084 0.119*
Terrorism-related risk 0.183*
Non-terrorism related risk 0.093
Social vulnerability 0.003
Urbanization -0.014
Agency size 0.005
Social vulnerability -0.007
Urbanization 0.009
Agency size 0.004
Monetary damage -0.016
Human damage 0.037
Number and diversity of events 0.041
R2 0.007 0.019 0.137
*p<0.05
Indirect effects via non-terrorism related risk
Indirect effects via terrorism-related risk
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The connection between perceived risk of homeland security incidents and 
homeland security preparedness has received considerable support in policing 
literature.  From a contingency theory perspective, organizations rationally respond to 
risks in their external environments by taking steps to prepare for homeland security 
incidents.  However, contrary to expectations, perceptions of risk and objective risk 
factors of homeland security incidents were not significantly associated in this study.   
When assessing actual risk for terrorist incidents and natural hazards, 
researchers and government organizations consider objective risk factors such as the 
vulnerability of the place and the population.  Within the psychological literature, these 
factors, in addition to experience with past hazards, shape perceptions of risk.  In the 
present study, the objective risk factors of social vulnerability, experience with past 
hazards, and urbanization not only do not impact risk perceptions, but they also are not 
associated with preparedness measures.  In other words, the homeland security 
preparedness levels of agencies are not influenced by the actual risk of those agencies’ 
jurisdictions.  Regardless of the statistical significance, within the sample the objective 
risk factors only explained less than two percent of the variation in perceived risk. 
Interestingly, while preparedness is not directly or indirectly influenced by 
objective risk factors, it is significantly associated with perceived risk.  Agency leaders 
who perceive their risk to be higher, independent of the actual risk of the jurisdiction, are 
more likely to take steps to enhance their preparedness.  Therefore, this study provides 
mixed support for contingency theory.  While perceived risk influences preparedness, 
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objective risk factors do not.  These results indicate that either the measures of 
objective risk used in this study are flawed (i.e., they may not be the most relevant risk 
factors to small municipal police agencies), or something other than these objective risk 
factors impact agency respondents’ perceptions of risk.  These could be individual-level 
characteristics of the respondents not captured in this survey, such as gender, race, 
and age.  This would mean that the responses depend on the member of the 
organization that responded to the survey.  To test whether individual-level 
characteristics are influencing perceived organizational-level risk, future studies should 
consider whether perceived risk is consistent across the department.  This type of 
study, when analyzed with objective risk factors, could determine not only if specified 
objective risk factors are associated with perceived risk, what personal characteristics 
are related to perceived risk. 
Policy Implications 
Homeland security has become an important aspect of policing in recent years, 
and there has been considerable funding allocated to this new function.  However, this 
study indicates that those departments that are the most prepared may not be the most 
at risk.  Whether using grants or local department funds, departments may not be using 
their resources wisely, as funds allocated to preparedness may be better used 
elsewhere in departments with low risk.  The databases used in this study are publicly 
available, and could be utilized at the national-level to determine which jurisdictions are 
the most at-risk or are the most vulnerable to homeland security incidents.  The 
Department of Homeland Security could target those departments to make them aware 
of their elevated risk levels and the availability of funding. 
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Limitations 
This study has several limitations that should be addressed in future research.  
All measures of objective risk factors (hazards, social vulnerability, and urbanization) 
are at the county-level, while the agency respondents were surveyed on the risk of 
incidents occurring within their jurisdiction.  Using the risk factors for specific 
jurisdictions would have been preferable, but data at this level were not available.  
Using the rural to urban continuum code instead of actual measures of physical 
vulnerability may not be a precise measurement of the actual physical vulnerability for a 
jurisdiction.  Unfortunately, there is not a database available that assesses physical 
vulnerability (like the social vulnerability database).  Future researchers, guided by past 
studies, should include true measures of physical vulnerability.   
The measures for past natural hazards were combined over the past ten years.  
Some of the agency respondents may not have lived in the same area so may not have 
personally experienced these hazards.  However, as long as the agency executive had 
lived in the area and experienced the past hazards, research has indicated that even six 
years after a hurricane, residents of cities who were exposed to the hurricane rated their 
risk of experiencing any natural disaster as higher in a control city that did not 
experience the hurricane (Norris, Smith, & Kaniasty, 1999).  Additionally, up to seven 
years after a fatal lightning storm, adolescents who went to school with a child who was 
killed still rated their perceived risk of encountering another fatal natural disaster as 
higher than those who did not (Greening et al., 1996).  However, future studies should 
collect data on the respondents’ history with the department to rule out this possible 
limitation. 
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Additionally, some hazards may have occurred in neighboring counties which the 
department may have assisted with.  Research has indicated that, while not as strong of 
a predictor as personal victimization, indirect or vicarious victimization has a significant 
association with perceived risk (Ferraro, 1995).  Furthermore, events that occurred last 
year may be more influential than hazards that occurred nine years ago.  For a more 
accurate picture of the effect of past hazards, using spatial and temporal factors would 
be ideal. 
While the social vulnerability index used is from the years 2005-2009, and our 
survey was mailed in 2011, it has been shown to be relatively stable over time.  From 
1960 to 2000, only 484 out of 3141 counties (15.4%) in the United States had a 
statistically significant change in their social vulnerability.  This was mostly due to an 
increase or decrease in population size or density (Cutter & Finch, 2008).  
Weinstein and Nicolich (1993) criticized much past research examining the 
correlation between risk perception and behaviors.  They noted that, in order to be 
accurate, these types of studies must be done longitudinally as the relationship between 
risk and behavior is bidirectional.  While this may be true of certain health protective 
behaviors (the example used in their article was risk of contracting AIDS – by taking 
protective measures, people could reduce their risk), this weakness does not apply to 
studies examining homeland security preparedness.  While it may be possible to 
mitigate the damage incurred by future homeland security incidents, simply enhancing 
preparedness to respond to a homeland security incident does not decrease the risk 
that an incident could occur (Weinstein & Nicolich, 1993).  
Directions for Future Research 
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Regardless of these limitations, this study is an important contribution because it 
indicates that small departments’ preparedness levels are not associated with the actual 
risk factors within the counties in which they are located.  This finding is contrary to 
expectations based on past research at the individual-level and in other fields.  While 
perceived risk predicts preparedness, the objective risk factors used in this study are 
not associated with either perceived risk or preparedness.  Future research should 
focus on determining whether department risk is consistent among all levels of the 
organization, what factors actually influence perceived risk, and the viability of the 
model in larger agencies.
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APPENDIX A 
Related Sections of the Survey Instrument 
Survey questions address homeland security, defined broadly to include efforts to protect against, prepare for, respond to, 
and recover from threats and hazards posed not only by terrorism but also major disasters/emergencies and catastrophic 
events that involve significant casualties and/or substantial destruction of property (e.g., severe weather, chemical spills, large 
explosions).  Please keep this broad all-hazards definition in mind when answering the following questions unless directed 
otherwise.  
1.  How would you rate the likelihood of the following types of terrorism-related and non-terrorism homeland 
security incidents occurring within your jurisdiction in the next five (5) years?  Evaluate each possible incident on 
a scale from 0 (not at all likely) to 10 (very likely). 
    
Not at 
all likely 
          
 Very 
likely 
The following terrorism-related 
homeland security incidents? (0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 1a. Chemical incident O O O O O O O O O O O 
 1b. Biological incident (e.g., 
anthrax, contamination of 
water/food supply) 
O O O O O O O O O O O 
 1c. Radiological incident O O O O O O O O O O O 
 1d. Conventional explosive 
incident 
O O O O O O O O O O O 
 1e. Cyber-terrorism O O O O O O O O O O O 
 1f. Terrorism incident involving 
military weapons 
O O O O O O O O O O O 
   Not at 
all likely 
         Very 
likely 
The following non-terrorism 
homeland security incidents? (0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 1g. Structural failure involving 
mass casualties 
O O O O O O O O O O O 
 1h. Severe weather (e.g., 
tornado, flood, mudslide, 
hurricane), earthquake, or 
wildfire 
O O O O O O O O O O O 
 1i. Explosion involving mass 
casualties 
O O O O O O O O O O O 
 1j. Chemical spill or radiological 
leak (e.g., derailed train, 
nuclear power plant) 
O O O O O O O O O O O 
 1k. Medical pandemic (e.g., 
avian flu, small pox) 
O O O O O O O O O O O 
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2. Agencies may take a variety of steps to enhance homeland security prevention, preparedness, response, and 
recovery.  Please indicate whether your agency engages in any of the following activities or steps.  Remember, 
homeland security is defined broadly to include both terrorism-related threats and major non-terrorism 
disasters or emergencies.    
  Yes No 
2a. Does your agency have an individual(s) or special unit specifically assigned to 
address the homeland security function? 
O O 
2b. Is your organization part of a regional interagency task force or working group 
that functions, in part, to address issues of prevention, preparedness, 
response, and/or recovery related to homeland security? 
O O 
2c. Within the past 12 months, have any members of your agency been trained in 
homeland security procedures? 
O O 
2d. Within the past 12 months, have members of your agency participated in 
homeland security-focused field training or table top exercises? 
O O 
2e. Does your agency have in place systematic procedures ensuring that 
homeland security advisories/emergency notifications are distributed to 
appropriate personnel? 
O O 
2f. Does your agency have a written directive or protocol for contacting the 
proper authorities in the event of a homeland security incident or threat 
within your jurisdiction? 
O O 
2g. Within the past 12 months, has your agency completed an inventory of 
threats or hazards in your jurisdiction? 
O O 
2h. Within the past 12 months, has your agency conducted a risk assessment to 
identify high-risk or high-value targets or assets within your jurisdiction? 
O O 
2i. Does your agency have a written response plan outlining preparedness, 
response, and/or recovery issues in the event of a homeland security-related 
incident? 
O O 
2j. Does your organization have in place one or more mutual aid or cooperative 
agreements with other law enforcement organizations that cover homeland 
security issues? 
O O 
2k. Does your organization have in place one or more mutual aid or cooperative 
agreements with non-law enforcement agencies such as transit services, 
public works, or other governmental agencies that cover homeland security 
issues? 
O O 
2l. Do the public safety agencies operating in or nearby your jurisdiction 
(including your agency) use a shared radio network that achieves 
interoperability?  
O O 
2m. Within the past 12 months, has your agency disseminated information to 
members of the community in an attempt to increase citizen preparedness? 
O O 
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